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|Google Glass and the Demise of Ownership +||''"Welcome to the shrinking privileges of ownership in an always-connected world. Are these terms beneficial for consumers? Clearly not. Are they even enforceable? To at least some extent, they probably are."'' +, ''"Another complication is that Google Glass, like many recent- and emerging-generation consumer electronics products, is made useful largely through its ability to connect to license-based service offerings. When you use a service such as Google Maps, you do so under a license to access the associated content—you’re a licensee, not an owner of that content."'' ''"The model of requiring purchasers of consumer electronics devices to first enter into restrictive contracts as a condition of sale and then to agree to restrictive licenses when using those devices raises multiple concerns. Most fundamentally, it does an end run around legal frameworks that evolved specifically to prohibit anti-competitive and consumer-unfriendly downstream control over transfers of ownership. And it’s confusing for consumers."'' +, ''"It’s tempting to think of the Glass resale restriction as simply another unwelcome consequence of the many legalese-laden agreements that we all encounter when using almost any online service. But most of those agreements involve restrictions on data, not the devices on which they reside. You can’t resell files containing songs downloaded from Amazon, map data from Google, or restaurant recommendations from Zagat. Our purchased devices, by contrast, have generally been ours to keep, sell, loan, or donate as we see fit. That flexibility is lost when a purchase comes with restrictions like those in the Glass terms of sale."'' +|
|Legally Flawed but Politically Sound. Digital Exhaustion of Copyright in Europe after UsedSoft +||<u>Therefore - if we follow ROGNSTAD's reasoning - when we deal with IoT products' components (obviously if covered by copyright protection) which are provided through the Net, to understand if they can be transferred from the first acquirer to a second acquirer, first of all we must wonder if the copyright holder could calculate the remuneration on the basis of the first act of exploitation: this happens, for example, when the component at stake is not multiplied, but used by one person at time, provided that it doesn't require the right holder's recurring or continuing intervention in order to be routinely used by the customer. We must nonetheless remember that the exhaustion principle doesn't apply to contracts for services (ROGNSTAD, p. 17, and ''Oracle v. UsedSoft'', § 60): therefore, we must verify if the contract between the right holder and the customer can be qualified as a sale, applying the definition of sale provided by the ''UsedSoft'' case. If these two conditions are satisfied, the copyright holder can't forbid the subsequent circulation of the component. This should apply ''a fortiori'' when the component at stake is not covered by copyright protection, even if in this case we must verify what definition of "sale" can apply. It may seem weird that it exists a principle of free circulation of services which allows to apply the rationale behind the exhaustion principle also to services, but the same principle can't apply to contracts for services. To understand this apparent incompatibility, we must differentiate the notion of "service" from the notion of "service contract". * "Service contracts" are all contracts that can't be qualified as sales contracts. Sales contracts are contracts which involve the transfer of ownership of goods in exchange for the payment of a price. See for example DIRECTIVE 2011/83/EU on consumer rights, Articles 2(5) and 2(6). * "Services", according to the TFEU, art. 57, are : ''"Services shall be considered to be ‘services’ within the meaning of the Treaties where they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons"''. Therefore, considering only the ratio between services and goods, services are all entities that can't be considered as goods. For example, if a videocassette is rented, the contract is a service contract, because there is no transfer of ownership, but the provisions of the TFEU concerning the free movement of goods would apply, because videocassettes are goods, not services (see for example the CJEU judgement ''Warner/Christiansen'' of 1988). ROGNSTAD's reasoning implies that the online service which allows the creation of the downloaded software copies is a service: in fact, the first acquirer obtains them through an act of reproduction and an act of communication to the public, and also the second acquirer obtains a copy through these two acts. But the product of these services is a copy (therefore, a good) whose ownership is transferred from the right holder to the first acquirer, therefore we can say that it is a sales contract. In my opinion, it would have been more easy, and correct, to say that the downloaded copies aren't tangible goods, so the exhaustion principle can't apply. However, they are still goods, so the principle of the free movement of goods can apply, and - if a transfer of ownership takes place - we can speak about a sales contract. It is true that, according to DIRECTIVE 2011/83/EU on consumer rights, Recital 19, ''"contracts for digital content which is not supplied on a tangible medium should be classified, for the purpose of this Directive, neither as sales contracts nor as service contract"''. However, an affirmation of that kind doesn't deny that intangible content could be the object of a transfer of ownership, and therefore further circulation should be possible when this transfer of ownership takes place.</u> +|
|The End of Ownership: Why You Need to Fight America's Copyright Laws +||''"While this ushers in a whole new world of possibilities, it’s also redefining ownership. Because when you purchase a physical object, you don’t actually buy the software in it — that code belongs to someone else. If you do something the manufacturer doesn’t like — repair it, hack it, unlock it — you could lose the right to use “their” software in “your” thing. And as these lines between physical and digital blur, it pits copyright and physical ownership rights against each other."'' +|
|The Epic Struggle of the Internet of Things +||Bruce STERLING, in ''“The Epic Struggle of the Internet of Things”'', says that IoT is not about Things on the Internet, and that individuals are no more “consumers” or “users” when IoT (as well as when Facebook, for example) is involved: IoT products providers would indeed be pleased to sell them at cost, because their aim is not to provide people with IoT products, but to implement digital surveillance. +|
|Unfair Contract Terms in European Law. A Study in Comparative and EC Law +||A general transparency requirement is stated: terms offered to consumers are expressed in plain, intelligible language; where terms are subject to different interpretations, the one which is the most favorable to the consumer must prevail (art. 5 Directive 93/13/EEC). +|