From Wiki IoT
This is a Text property.
Pages using the property "CC7"
Showing 4 pages using this property.
|Google Glass and the Demise of Ownership +||''"Another complication is that Google Glass, like many recent- and emerging-generation consumer electronics products, is made useful largely through its ability to connect to license-based service offerings. When you use a service such as Google Maps, you do so under a license to access the associated content—you’re a licensee, not an owner of that content."'' ''"The model of requiring purchasers of consumer electronics devices to first enter into restrictive contracts as a condition of sale and then to agree to restrictive licenses when using those devices raises multiple concerns. Most fundamentally, it does an end run around legal frameworks that evolved specifically to prohibit anti-competitive and consumer-unfriendly downstream control over transfers of ownership. And it’s confusing for consumers."'' +|
|I Contratti di Internet. Sottoscrizione, Nuovi Contratti, Tutela del Consumatore, Privacy e Mezzi di Pagamento +||According to Italian law (Italian Civil Code, articles 1667 and 1570), the body of laws applicable to those contracts between a ISP and a customer for the supply of Internet access is formed by the provisions regarding the ''“contratto di somministrazione”'' (art. 1159) and the ''“contratto di appalto”'' (art. 1655), the latter applying only when compatible with the former, and anyway in a subordinate position. +|
|LG Will Take The 'Smart' Out Of Your Smart TV If You Don't Agree To Share Your Viewing And Search Data With Third Parties +||The use of most of the smart features of the TV requires the creation of an LG SmartWorld Account: ''"For example, some of our services require that you become a member of LG SmartWorld, which may be subject to separate terms. You may join LG SmartWorld either through your LG Smart TV or by other means, such as through certain LG websites. This Membership Information may include your user ID, password, telephone number, name, date of birth, gender, email address, address, social networking service ID, security question answers, purchase history, and related payment information, such as credit card information or details of your PayPal account and more."'' +|
|Legally Flawed but Politically Sound. Digital Exhaustion of Copyright in Europe after UsedSoft +||<u>Therefore - if we follow ROGNSTAD's reasoning - when we deal with IoT products' components (obviously if covered by copyright protection) which are provided through the Net, to understand if they can be transferred from the first acquirer to a second acquirer, first of all we must wonder if the copyright holder could calculate the remuneration on the basis of the first act of exploitation: this happens, for example, when the component at stake is not multiplied, but used by one person at time, provided that it doesn't require the right holder's recurring or continuing intervention in order to be routinely used by the customer. We must nonetheless remember that the exhaustion principle doesn't apply to contracts for services (ROGNSTAD, p. 17, and ''Oracle v. UsedSoft'', § 60): therefore, we must verify if the contract between the right holder and the customer can be qualified as a sale, applying the definition of sale provided by the ''UsedSoft'' case. If these two conditions are satisfied, the copyright holder can't forbid the subsequent circulation of the component. This should apply ''a fortiori'' when the component at stake is not covered by copyright protection, even if in this case we must verify what definition of "sale" can apply. It may seem weird that it exists a principle of free circulation of services which allows to apply the rationale behind the exhaustion principle also to services, but the same principle can't apply to contracts for services. To understand this apparent incompatibility, we must differentiate the notion of "service" from the notion of "service contract". * "Service contracts" are all contracts that can't be qualified as sales contracts. Sales contracts are contracts which involve the transfer of ownership of goods in exchange for the payment of a price. See for example DIRECTIVE 2011/83/EU on consumer rights, Articles 2(5) and 2(6). * "Services", according to the TFEU, art. 57, are : ''"Services shall be considered to be ‘services’ within the meaning of the Treaties where they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons"''. Therefore, considering only the ratio between services and goods, services are all entities that can't be considered as goods. For example, if a videocassette is rented, the contract is a service contract, because there is no transfer of ownership, but the provisions of the TFEU concerning the free movement of goods would apply, because videocassettes are goods, not services (see for example the CJEU judgement ''Warner/Christiansen'' of 1988). ROGNSTAD's reasoning implies that the online service which allows the creation of the downloaded software copies is a service: in fact, the first acquirer obtains them through an act of reproduction and an act of communication to the public, and also the second acquirer obtains a copy through these two acts. But the product of these services is a copy (therefore, a good) whose ownership is transferred from the right holder to the first acquirer, therefore we can say that it is a sales contract. In my opinion, it would have been more easy, and correct, to say that the downloaded copies aren't tangible goods, so the exhaustion principle can't apply. However, they are still goods, so the principle of the free movement of goods can apply, and - if a transfer of ownership takes place - we can speak about a sales contract. It is true that, according to DIRECTIVE 2011/83/EU on consumer rights, Recital 19, ''"contracts for digital content which is not supplied on a tangible medium should be classified, for the purpose of this Directive, neither as sales contracts nor as service contract"''. However, an affirmation of that kind doesn't deny that intangible content could be the object of a transfer of ownership, and therefore further circulation should be possible when this transfer of ownership takes place.</u> +|